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ABSTRACT  
Evolutionary approaches of the firm devote a part of their analysis to firm behavior and to some processes acting inside the 
firm, however the internal workings of firms are, most of the time, not deeply analyzed. In this perspective, this paper 
attempts to investigate whether "we can drop internal selection in the evolutionary analysis of the firm". 
In order to answer this question, we propose a micro-simulation model of internal selection where firms are engaged in 
production and R&D activities. They carry out two kinds of R&D and do not run any imitation process. Internal selection 
acts on R&D projects and we measure the impact of the selection mechanism on the firms' performances. 
The model generates persistent differences between firms according to their internal selection process.  
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Approches évolutionnistes de la firme et sélection interne 
 
RESUME 
Les approches évolutionnistes de la firme centrent une partie leurs travaux sur l’analyse du comportement des firmes et de 
certains processus agissant au sein des organisations. Mais le plus souvent les mécanismes intra-organisationnels ne sont 
pas précisément étudiés. Ainsi, cet article s’intéresse à la question de savoir si la sélection interne peut ou non être éludée 
par les analyses évolutionnistes de la firme. 
Afin de répondre à cette question, nous proposons un modèle de micro-simulation centré sur la question de la sélection 
interne. Les firmes sont engagées à la fois dans des activités productives et des activités de R&D, elles conduisent deux 
types de R&D mais ne font pas d’imitation. La sélection interne porte sur les projets de R&D. Le modèle permet de mesurer 
l’impact des mécanismes de sélection interne sur la performance des firmes. Il génère notamment des différences 
persistantes dans les performances des firmes selon le type de sélection interne qui les caractérise. 
 
MOTS CLES : Dynamique de marché, Innovation, Performance Technologique, R&D, Sélection Interne 
 
JEL CODES: C63, L11, L21, O32 
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1- Introduction 
 
As suggested by Levinthal (1991) and by Warglien (1995), selection and 
adaptation processes may coexist as explanations of organizational evolution. 
Internal selection as well as market selection contributes to shape the evolution of  a 
portfolio of projects, which influences the diffusion of organizational competences 
over the firm. A successful effort in R&D can lead to the emergence of an 
unexpected breakthrough and then to the reorganization of the firm competence base 
(Warglien, 1995). 
We argue that the study of internal selection mechanisms is essential to the analysis 
of a firm’s evolution and workings as far as internal selection is an intra-
organizational mechanism which consequences appear in the external behavior of 
the firm. In particular, it seems internal selection influences firms' performances. 
However, most of the time, evolutionary approaches of the firm neglect these 
aspects. In fact, there is a sort of dichotomy between intra-organizational and inter-
organizational analyses. On one side, inter-organizational works deal for instance 
with innovation and its diffusion process or with competitive analysis, but in any 
case they set a fixed state of internal organization. On the other side, intra-
organizational works focus on firms’ internal workings without any link to the 
external environment. Knowledge is then the central element of analysis.  
However, in both cases, there is no link between both dimensions. With this 
dichotomy, the question of internal selection is left aside even more. Moreover the 
transposition of the Darwinian framework to the evolutionary analysis of the firm 
reinforces this distinction between intra and inter-organizational works as far as 
mutation and selection are disconnected in the Darwinian paradigm. 
The study of the intersection of those dimensions highlights the importance of 
internal selection processes. Internal selection regulates intra-organizational changes 
according to the selection criteria defined by the firm itself. Internal selection is then 
clearly different from market selection. In particular, it restores the internal 
coherence of the firm which mutations can disrupt. Indeed, a selection mechanism 
acts only if there is variation. As suggested in Jacoby (2002, 2003), the 
transformation of the firm follows a Lamarckian process in which learning 
mechanisms and interactions with environments –internal and external- are 
important factors in change which base selection mechanisms.  
Internal selection depends on the nature of its operative modalities and on the 
criteria it uses. It is characterized by selection criteria defined by the firm itself and 
by the existence of an internal selector agent acting within the firm. This selector 
agent - individual or collective - guides the selection process. Owing to his tacit 
skills, the selector agent is supposed a priori to be able to lead the selection process 
in the direction intended by the firm. He guides and/or influences the internal 
selection process by imposing constraints (minimal profitability or social 
constraints, for example) and/or by orientating the strategic goals of the firm. 
However he can fail. In the real world, the selector agent is either the R&D project 
manager or the one of the chairmen or else another influential or charismatic agent 
acting within the firm. His power can be different in one firm from another and 
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within the firm it can change over the different selection mechanisms. Sometimes he 
can be very powerful, some others not. 
The intensity and efforts in  R&D, past successes, the structure of incentives with 
regard to risk-taking, and the diverse modalities of resource allocation within the 
firm, are some of the internal selection criteria we can find inside the firm 
(Warglien, 1995).1 At a more general level, the influence of the external 
environment and the pressures of the internal one result in the emergence of 
complementary criteria. The external environment concerns the market and 
competition between rival firms. It is the reflection of scientific and technological 
progress and originates in macro-economic upheavals. Symmetrically, the internal 
environment is composed of formal or informal decision-making processes and 
interactions among individuals. It also takes into account the constraints of 
organizational structures, technological and marketing practices, and financial 
constraints. Lastly, the degree of irreversibility of engagement as well as the demand 
for minimum profitability also influences the selection process. 
 
Thus this paper aims at demonstrating the necessity to study internal selection and to 
integrate systematically this mechanism in the analysis of the evolution of firms and 
industries. In order to illustrate this theoretical purpose, we developed an original 
micro-simulation model, representing the internal working of the firm and 
highlighting the importance of internal selection. This model does not offer an 
exhaustive representation of internal mechanisms, it is a qualitative model that aids 
the comprehension of intra-organizational processes. 
 
 
2- The Baseline Model 
 
The micro-simulation model we present is a simplified representation of a 
population of multi-product firms. The model is non-linear, stochastic and dynamic. 
It comes within the tradition of Nelson & Winter models centered on technical 
progress and Schumpeterian competition. 
On the supply side, firms are engaged in productive and research activities. On the 
demand side, markets are characterized by prices. Capital is the only input in 
production, therefore capital productivity indicates the efficiency of the technology 
used by the firm. 
Firms commit productive and R&D activities, they do not perform any imitation 
process. They commit systematically R&D for product diversification and R&D for 
process innovation. With process innovation they can improve their productivity 
level using a more efficient technology. The diversification strategy leads them to 
develop new products and then to enter new markets. So before the market 
competitive pressure, the firms are engaged in an internal selection process. 
 
As Llerena and Oltra (2000) show, the daily economic development is characterized 
by the growing diversity of products and services. While some new products appear, 
                                                 
1 Those criteria are represented in the model we present in this paper. 
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some others disappear and then the balance between the emergence of new products 
and the disappearance of existing goods determines the net static variety of the 
economic system at a given point in time (Llerena, Oltra, 2000). The model 
highlights the consequences of competition on the markets showing that some goods 
exit the market because of the high competitive pressure. But the core of the model 
concerns the internal selection processes acting on R&D projects and the 
consequences of this selection mechanism on the firm's performances. The impact 
on performance is measured in particular through the firm profit level, market share 
and productivity level resulting from the technology and product selected. 
 
2-1- Firms’ activities and technological change 
 
In the model, firms are simultaneously engaged in productive and research & 
development activities. R&D is a source of technological improvement for the firm. 
After explaining the production process, we will focus on R&D activities and on 
internal selection mechanisms. Internal selection has different functions within the 
firm. It acts on R&D projects for process innovation in order to select the different 
technological opportunities but internal selection also concerns diversification 
projects. 
 
 
 
2-1-1- Productive activities 
 
Each firm is engaged in several productive activities acting on different markets 
with a specific demand. At the same time, firms follow a diversification strategy.  
The current activities of the firm undergo the competitive pressure of the market 
they are active in. They struggle to increase their market share and profit level. 
 
Firms use only capital as input, so capital is numeraire and its unit cost is 
supposed equal to one. The technology used by the firm i in the production process 
j2 at time t is characterized by its productivity level Aij(t). This productivity level 
results from the equation: 
(1)   [ ])( ; )1( )( tAtAMaxtA pcijijij −=
where is the productivity level resulting from the R&D for process 
innovation
)(tApcij
3. Technological improvements are achieved after costly and risky R&D 
activities (Dosi, 1988b). The technological change is not inherent in the capital 
but it has an external source: firm innovation. Technological change is 
endogenously determined and firms invest in R&D in order to innovate and 
ultimately improve their productivity. 
 
                                                 
2 j identifies the different activities or production processes the firm is engaged in.  
3 Process innovation and diversification activities are identified with the exponents “pc” and 
“pd”, respectively. 
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For each activity, the quantity of capital dedicated to the production process is 
determined according to the following equation: 
(2) 
 
[ ] pdijij
j
pd
ijijiijijijijijij ItDItDtIttKItErtKtK ⋅+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅−⋅++⋅−⋅−= ∑ )()()()()()(1)1()( α
The capital stock per productive activity includes four components: 
i) The first gives the capital stock depreciated at rate rij. This rate is a parameter of 
the model. 
ii) The second element refers to the replacement of the depreciated share of capital. 
The equation  iv)(5) defined below gives more details. 
iii) The third component ( ∑ ⋅−
j
pd
ijiji ItDtI )()( ) gives the total available investment 
for the current products. This total investment is distributed between the different 
productive activities according to αij(t) which reflects the contribution of each 
activity to the total free cash-flow. 
iv) Finally, Ipd is a "launching investment" the firm dedicates to the new activities. 
It is a parameter of the model. 
 
The distinction between new and old activities follows those rules: 
(3)  ⎩⎨
⎧=
otherwise           0
effective isactivity  Production  if           1
)(tEij
 
(4)  
⎩⎨
⎧ >==
otherwise           0
)(  &  2ge  if            1
)( ij
pd
iji
ij
ItIa
tD
Dij(t) indicates the new productive activities which can benefit from a "launching 
investment". 
 
The sequence of investment is in favor of the research & development as far as after 
replacing the depreciated share of capital, the firm firstly determines the R&D 
budget before affecting the resulting part to the net capital investment. All the firms 
are innovative, they do not run any imitation process, there is no embodied technical 
progress, and so R&D activities are the only source of innovation. 
 
The capital depreciates with the rate rij. It is replaced only if the productive activity 
still exists and if its cash-flow is positive. Then the replacement respects the 
following rule:  
 
(5)  
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−≤<
−>−
=
otherwise0
)1()(0  if)(
)1()(  if                  )1(
)( trKtt
trKttrK
tKI ijijij
ijijij
ij ππ
π
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The share of capital net investment is determined according to αij(t) (see equation 
 (2)) reflecting the policy of the firm in terms of net capital investment. αij(t) takes 
any value between 0 and 1 and reflects the contribution of the productive activity to 
the total free cash-flow. 
Ii(t), the capital investment for the entire firm, is computed as: 
 
(6)  ⎩⎨
⎧ >ΠΠ⋅−= otherwise       0 0)(  if       )()1()( tttI iii δ
where δ is the distribution rule of the total free cash flow between capital net 
investment and R&D budgets. δ is a parameter and δ ∈ [0;1].  
δ determines the distribution strategy of the firms between capital investment and 
research and development. The firms’ diversity can be measured through their 
innovation strategies and so through the value of δ. Some of them focus on R&D 
(δ is high) while some others have a lower propensity to take risks and prefer to 
invest in capital (δ is low). As notice by Nelson & Winter (1982), with bounded 
rationality and radical uncertainty, firms develop different knowledge and 
skills leading them towards different innovation trajectories. In this model, the 
firms can be differentiated, in particular, thanks to their innovation behavior. 
 
The free cash flow, Πi, results from the different productive activities the firm is 
engaged in: 
(7) ( )∑ −=Π
j
ijiji tKItt )()()( π  
 
We assume that the variable production cost per unit of capital is constant over time 
so the cash-flow of each productive activity is given by: 
 
(8) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+−+−⋅−⋅= )1(
)1()1()1()()()( ta
tRDtRDtKctPtqt
pd
ipc
ijijijjijijπ    
where cij is the unit production cost as a fraction of the capital stock and RD the cost 
of R&D supported by the activity j. 
a(t-1) gives the number of productive activities of the firm at t-1. 
 
2-1-2- R&D activities 
 
Since the model focuses on internal selection processes, it is interested only in 
innovative firms. So, every firm is engaged in R&D activities for which it allocates a 
budget. The R&D budget is a share of the free cash flow. We assume that R&D is a 
priority for the firms since their survival depends on their ability to increase their 
productivity level. So after covering the physical depreciation of capital in each 
activity, the resulting cash flow is centralized at the firm level, which then 
decides to distribute it between R&D first and net capital investment 
afterwards. This simple decision rule reflects bounded rationality. 
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The total R&D budget of the firm is given by: 
(9)    δ∈ [0;1] ⎩⎨
⎧ >ΠΠ⋅= otherwise               0 0)(  if               )()( ii tttRD iδ
 
Afterwards, the firm divides this budget between R&D for process innovation and 
R&D centered on the diversification strategy. The total R&D budget is entirely 
distributed.  
Search is uncertain, so it is modeled as a stochastic process. This stochastic process 
reflects the fact that a random element captures the uncertainty of the link between 
innovative effects and final outcomes (Silverberg, Verspagen, 1995). As in Llerena, 
Oltra, (2000), the innovation process consists in a draw of a productivity level in a 
normal distribution. 
 
 
The firm is engaged in as many R&D projects for process innovation as production 
processes. The firm thus determines first the total budget of R&D for process 
innovation and then it distributes it between the different individual projects. The 
global budget for process innovation is given by: 
 
(10)  
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ >−⋅=
otherwise                    0
                    
0)1(   if                    )()(
)(
pc
i tAtRDt
tRD
ii
pc
i
γ
 
where γi(t) measures -at the firm level- the contribution of R&D for process 
innovation to the productivity improvement4. 
Following the rule we define for the global budget, each individual process 
innovation R&D budget is determined according to the relative expected 
productivity level of the project. 
 
The expected productivity level resulting from each R&D activity is given by the 
following equation5: 
(11)  ( )pcijpcij  ; (t) )( σmtApcij Ν≈
 where: 
(12) )1(
)1()1()( −
−+−= tK
tRDtAtm
ij
pc
ij
ij
pc
ij  
 )1( −tAij is the productivity level of the activity j at t-1 
                                                 
4 Please refer to appendix for more details. 
5 In order to keep in mind the dynamics of capital productivity, let's remember the equation 
 (1) presented above: [ ])( ; )1( )( tAtAMaxtA pcijijij −=   
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 is the R&D budget of j for process innovation  )1( −tRD pcij
 is the stock of capital at t-1 for the activity j )1( −tKij
 σijpc is the standard deviation of the normal distribution. It is a parameter 
whose value reflects the uncertainty of the research process. The higher σ the more 
risky the R&D. 
 
Process innovations are evaluated through their expected productivity level. The 
selection process for new technologies is based on the following maximization 
function: 
 (1)   [ ])( ; )1( )( tAtAMaxtA pcijijij −=
If the technology discovered with process innovation is more efficient than the one 
the firm is currently using in this productive activity, the firm switches. 
Whatever the propensity of firms for risks, they all use the same selection 
mechanism for process innovation. 
 
We assume that the innovative draws are centered, in particular, on the current 
productivity level. The more the firms have invested at t-1, the higher the chances to 
obtain a high expected productivity level at t ( ). This reflects the learning 
effect on R&D. The cumulativeness of innovation illustrated by the way m is 
defined implies that the result of innovation is at least partly determined by past 
technological performances. This cumulativeness can be explained by the fact 
that the firm stays in the same technological trajectory. 
)(tApcij
 
 
Before starting a diversification project, the firm determines randomly a target 
market among the market space composed of all the markets of the model in which 
the firm is not already active. The R&D budget represents the amount of resources 
available for the diversification. The budget is given by: 
(13)  ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ >−⋅=
otherwise                   0
0)1(   if                   )()(
)(
tAtRDt
tRD
pd
iipd
i
β
 
The budget for diversification is a share of the total R&D budget of the firm 
(RDi(t)); it exists only if the R&D was "successful" at the previous period, i.e. only 
if the expected productivity level of the diversification project at t-1 was positive. 
This share of R&D is determined according to the relative productivity level. The 
idea is, the more successful the R&D for diversification compared to the other R&D 
activities, the higher the budget. β reflects this idea. 6
 
 
                                                 
6 For more details on β, please refer to appendix. 
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The project efficiency is measured thanks to the expected productivity level defined 
as follows: 
(14)  ( )pdipdi  ; (t) )( σmtApdi Ν≈
where: 
σipd is the standard deviation of the normal distribution. It is a parameter 
whose value reflects the uncertainty of the research process. The higher σ, the more 
risky the R&D. 
 (t)pdim is the mean of the normal distribution, with: 
(15) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+−⋅=
)1(
)1()1( )(  
tK
tRDtAtm
i
pd
i
i
pd
i λ  
where: 
(16) ∑
=
−−=−
a
j
iji tAtatA 1
 )1()1(
1)1( the average productivity of the firm i at t-1 
(17) ∑
=
−−=−
a
j
iji tKtatK 1
)1()1(
1)1( the average stock of capital of the firm i at 
t-1 
 a(t) is the number of different productive activities for the firm at t  
 λ represents the entry barrier. λ∈ [0; 1], if λ=1 the market is contestable, if 
λ=0 the entry barrier is maximum, there is non-contestability. λ is a parameter of the 
model. 
The mean of the distribution is centered on the average productivity level of the firm 
computed over all the productive activities. With this cumulativeness, the 
innovation process is cumulative and path dependent. 
 
Internal selection of diversification projects is a slightly more complex process than 
internal selection of process innovations, in particular because it varies according to 
the propensity of firms to take risks and because of the existence of an internal 
selector agent. As we suggested in the first part of the paper, only a “powerful” 
selector agent can enforce the selection process when the economic criteria are not 
met. He can push in favor of a specific project although it does not seem to be 
profitable with regard to the economic criteria. In the version of the model we are 
presenting here, this situation occurs, with a probability 0,25% (Pr(SA=1)=0,25%), 
whatever the propensity of firms to take risks. It is a very seldom situation. 
 
Diversification allows the firm to enter a new market. If the R&D is successful i.e. if 
the economic characteristics of the project suit the internal selection process, the 
firm develops a new product permitting its entrance on a new market. 
The economic criteria of the internal selection process rely on the expected revenue 
per unit of capital and on the R&D budget. The revenue per unit of capital ( ) is 
computed with its expected productivity level and the current price on the target 
market:  
pd
ikY
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(18)  )()()( tPtAtY pdipdik β⋅=
 where Pβ is the current price observed on the target market β. 
 
To be selected a project has to respect an economic criterion on its expected revenue 
per unit of capital and the R&D budget –for diversification- has to be positive. The 
higher the propensity of firms to take risks, the lower the threshold of selection on 
the expected revenue per unit of capital. 
Therefore, firms with a high propensity to take risks develop their diversification 
projects when their expected revenues per unit of capital are higher than the revenue 
per unit of capital of their least profitable productive activity. On the contrary, firms 
with a low propensity to take risks fix their threshold to the revenue per unit of 
capital of the most profitable productive activity. 
 
2-2- Market dynamics 
 
Firms are multi-product, they are active on different markets. On each of them, the 
firms offer a quantity qij(t) defined as follows: 
(19) )1()1()( −⋅−= tAtKtq ijijij  
 
At the market level, the total supply corresponds to the sum of individual quantities 
produced by each firm active on the market: 
(20) ∑=
i
ijj tqtQ )()(  
 
As in Nelson & Winter (1982b), the price is given by the unit-elastic demand 
function: 
(21) ε)()( tQ
dtP
j
j =    
where d is the demand and ε the elasticity of demand constantly equal to 1. 
We assume that products are homogenous. All quantities produced are absorbed by 
the market, adjustment is done through prices. Say's law is implicitly assumed, there 
is no explicit demand curve for output, (Nelson, Winter, 1973). 
 
The revenue of firms on each market results from the following equation: 
(22) )()()( tPtqty jijij ⋅=  
 
At the firm level it is trivial to determine the total revenue of the firm resulting from 
the different productive activities offering different quantities of goods on different 
markets. This total revenue is determined as follows: 
(23) ∑ ⋅=
j
jiji tPtqtY )()()(  
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In order to characterize the evolution of industrial structures, we use the Inverse 
Herfindahl index measuring market concentration: 
(24) 
∑
=
= n
i
ij
j
tms
tInvHerf
1
2)(
1)(  
where firms' market shares are defined as follows: 
(25) )(
)()( tQ
tqtms
j
ij
ij =  
 
 
Firms can enter and exit freely on each competitive markets. 
As internal selection acts on R&D projects, an evolutionary mechanism of selection 
governs the evolution of industrial structure. In order to model this selection 
mechanism we defined exit criteria according to which firms exit markets when their 
economic performances are below a specific threshold. Whatever the propensity of 
firms to take risks, they exit a market either when their market shares are lower than 
0.5% or when their profit and cash-flow are negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
3- Simulation Results 
 
In order to demonstrate the necessity for the evolutionary theory of the firm of 
studying internal selection mechanisms, we present the main results obtained with 
the micro-simulation model. So let us firstly present the protocol of simulation and 
in particular initial conditions. The second point will make explicit the main 
simulation results. 
 
3-1- Protocol of simulation 
 
We consider a population of 120 firms initially with 12 different productive 
activities. On the demand side, there are 36 markets with a specific demand 
coefficient. The 120 firms are randomly but equally distributed over the markets. 
Each market counts initially 40 firms.  
All firms are initially identical and in order to show the stability of the model we 
start with a stationary state. Then an exogenous shock7 is introduced on one of the 
36 demands after 5 periods, it launches the dynamics of the system. Whatever the 
characteristics, initial market shares are the same and prices on each market are 
equal to one. The 36 markets are on equilibrium. 
 
                                                 
7 At the fifth period, the demand on one market randomly chosen increases of 10%. 
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Figure 1: Model structure 
 
 
 
 
Firms perform R&D activities for process innovation and for product diversification. 
When R&D is successful firms either develop or integrate a new production 
technology (process innovation), or they enter a new market (diversification 
strategy). Selection is internal when it acts on R&D projects but external when it 
acts on firms active on markets. Then the number of firms in the model is varying 
according to their performances but the number of markets is fixed. 
 
Each simulation counts 2500 iterations in order to show the tendency of the model to 
converge towards a lasting quasi-stationary state. 
 
To study the impact of internal selection on the firms' performances, we test four 
configurations dealing with different modalities of internal selection and different 
environments. Within configurations, firms differ with respect to their propensity to 
take risks and with respect to the degree of influence of the internal selector agent. 
There are two homogenous and two heterogeneous configurations with 120 firms 
each, their composition is reported in Table 1. Configurations A and D are 
homogenous, they count only firms of the same type; whereas populations B and C 
are heterogeneous, they mix firms with different propensity to take risks. 
 
 12 
 
 
Table 1: Configurations composition 
 A B C D 
Number of firms 120 120 120 120 
Powerful S.A. 
(SA=1) 
60 40 20 0 low propensity to 
take risks 
Neutral S.A. 
(SA=0) 
60 40 20 0 
Powerful S.A. 
(SA=1) 
0 20 40 60 high propensity 
to take risks 
Neutral S.A. 
(SA=0) 
0 20 40 60 
 
The firms with a low propensity to take risks spend 20% of their cash flow in R&D 
and 80% in net capital investment, whereas those with a high propensity to take 
risks spend 70% of their cash flow in R&D and 30% in net capital investment. 
 
For each configuration, we run 50 simulations8 in order to ease the effects of the 
stochastic draws. The idea is to generate enough history to be able to tackle the 
emergent properties of the system and in particular to infer properties relatively 
independent of the sequences of random numbers. The sensitivity tests show that the 
different simulations represent the same economic situation9. Thus, any simulation 
can be chosen as representative. In this perspective, we present the results of a 
representative simulation chosen in the modal distribution. 
 
In order to analyze the results, we choose as reference the configuration with the 
lowest internal selection mechanism (D). Among the studied configurations, the 
closest to the situation in which there is no internal selection is the homogeneous 
population where all the firms have a high propensity to take risks. This is also the 
closest situation to the Nelson & Winter model in which there is no internal 
selection. 
 
3-2- Main results 
 
* Firms survival 
In the spirit of Winter (1964), the existence of at least one more rigorous firm in a 
population strengthens the strictness of internal selection and then promotes the 
survival of firms with the lowest propensity to take risks. 
 
                                                 
8 For simulation work, we use the Laboratory for Simulation Development, a software 
package developed by Marco Valente firstly at IIASA and then at Aalborg University 
(Valente, 1998). 
9 For more details on those tests, see Jacoby (2002). 
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The results we obtain concerning the survival rates confirm this point. Indeed in 
hybrid configurations (B and C), the survival rates for firms with a low propensity to 
take risks are higher than those of firms with a high propensity to take risks. Finally 
even when they are not initially dominant, firms with a low propensity to take risks 
survive better than those with a high propensity.  
Thus it seems that the lower the propensity of firms to take risks, the stricter their 
internal selection mechanism, the higher their survival probability. 
 
 
Proposition 1: A low propensity to take risks and the existence of a non-neutral 
selector agent strengthen the survival probability of firms 
through the strictness of their internal selection. 
 
 
* Diversification and industrial structure 
Diversification is measured with the number of different markets a firm is active in. 
Intuitively we could think that firms with a high propensity to take risks are more 
diversified than other firms. However the results show the opposite. At tend, firms 
with a low propensity to take risks count on average more productive activities than 
firms with a high propensity to take risks. 
 
On average, and whatever the propensity of firms to take risks, diversification is 
rather weak. The firms are engaged in less than 3 productive activities –on average- 
while they were producing 12 different goods at the beginning. A deeper analysis 
shows that this reduction in the number of productive activities appears very quickly 
after the exit from the initial stationary state. In a second step, some firms increase 
their productions but the competition leads most of them to a second reduction. 
The average diversification rates show that firms with a high propensity to take risks 
are finally less diversified than firms with a lower propensity to take risks. The 
configurations with the biggest proportion of risk-taken firms (C and D) have the 
smallest average number of productive activities. At the opposite, configurations 
with the biggest proportion of non risk-taken firms (A and B) have the highest rates. 
 
Then it seems that the propensity of firms to take risks influences their 
diversification strategy. The low propensity seems to strengthen the diversification 
whereas the high propensity to take risks seems to favor refocusing10. 
As far as firms' strategic decisions are not modelized here, the diversification or 
refocusing behavior relies on selection mechanisms. Indeed, the higher the 
propensity of firms to take risks, the weaker the internal selection mechanism and 
then the more influential the market selection. 
 
                                                 
10 With "refocusing", we understand the reduction in the number of firms' productive 
activities. 
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Proposition 2: The evolution of industrial structure and the competitive pressure 
lead to the reduction in the number of firms' productive 
activities. 
 
Proposition 3: On the whole, firms are weakly diversified but the lower the 
propensity to take risks the higher the diversification. 
 
 
* Performances 
Performance is measured with different indicators. The evaluation of firm 
profitability uses average profit level and cash flow. The technological performance 
is measured with average productivity whereas total capital stock and number of 
markets occupied inform about the firm size. 
We are interested by the performance of surviving firms at the end. In order to 
compare the different configurations, the results are summarized by a box-plot 
representation, for the comparison we perform mean comparison tests11. 
 
 
According to Table 2, the distribution of the configuration D12 is quite different from 
the others.  
The configurations counting a proportion of firms with a low propensity to take risks 
have obviously a higher stock of capital. Thus it seems that the lower the propensity 
of firms to take risks, the higher their capital stock. This is confirmed by the results 
of Tukey-Kramer tests according to which the configurations B and C are not 
substantially different with a p-value=0.9995. The results for the comparison 
between A and B and A and C are, respectively, p-value=0.4795 and p-
value=0.6251. 
 
We check the number of firms is roughly the same in all configurations as well as 
the homogeneity of distribution of capital between those firms within each 
configuration13. Thus those elements cannot explain the differences between 
configurations. 
Because firm capital growth can be explained either by process innovation (which 
causes productivity growth) or by the development of new profitable activities, the 
link with internal selection mechanism becomes obvious. On the one hand, the 
quantity of capital grows by means of capital investment which exists only if the 
firm generates enough profit to invest. On the other hand, growing profit originates 
either in capital productivity growth, i.e. in process innovation, or in successful 
diversification. The internal selection acting on process innovation is the same 
whatever the propensity of firms to take risks but it differs in the selection of 
diversification projects. 
                                                 
11 Those tests are Tukey-Kramer tests. 
12 Homogenous configuration with high propensity firms. 
13 For more details on those points, see Jacoby (2002). 
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The strictness of internal selection criteria acting on the diversification projects 
strengthens the probability of success of the new products on the market. Indeed if it 
allows the firm to develop new profitable activities, it directly influences the profit 
generation which takes part in capital growth. Following Winter (1964), it seems in 
our case the presence of at least one more rigorous firm in a population strengthens 
the strictness of the selection mechanism and thus the effectiveness of internal 
selection.  
 
Proposition 4: The effectiveness of internal selection promotes firms' capital stock 
growth. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of total capital stocks 
 
 
Concerning technological performances, the box-plots on Table 3 show that all the 
configurations obtain on average the same results in term of capital productivity. 
The Tukey-Kramer tests confirm this observation. 
 
If we consider the R&D for process innovation, whatever their propensity to take 
risks all firms use the same internal selection mechanism. Since there is no reason to 
think that some firms could use their R&D budget more efficiently 14, the 
differences between internal selection processes acting on diversification projects 
can explain those surprising results. 
 
                                                 
14 There is no technical reason in the model for such a situation.  
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If we consider that on average R&D for process innovation gives the same results in 
all cases, it appears that firms with smaller R&D budgets for diversification and 
stricter selection criteria obtain the same results as firms with a higher propensity to 
take risks which spend more in R&D. The quantity of resources firms dedicate to 
R&D does not seem to influence final performances, but the internal selection 
mechanism is central in the explanation of technological performance growth. 
 
Proposition 5: The strictness of internal selection criteria acting on diversification 
projects positively influences the technological performances of 
firms. 
 
The amount of R&D firms spend cannot guarantee better performances. To be 
efficient, the R&D policy of firms should simultaneously concern R&D budgets and 
internal selection criteria. 
In this perspective, it could be interesting to test a new configuration with strict 
selection criteria and bigger R&D budgets. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of capital productivity 
 
 
 
4- Conclusion and Discussion 
 
We have presented a micro-simulation model of internal selection developed in the 
tradition of the Schumpeterian competition model of Nelson & Winter (1982b). We 
focus on the idea that evolutionary works certainly cannot drop internal selection 
mechanisms in their analysis. 
The model generates persistent differences between firms with different propensities 
to take risks, and the simulation results show that the weakness of internal selection 
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mechanisms slows down a firm's progress. In this case firms refer to market forces 
much more than to internal forces. Internal selection positively influences the firms' 
performances growth. Market selection and internal selection are complementary 
and essential to firm growth. 
Finally the results suggest that the efficiency of internal selection refers to the 
strictness of its criteria. The stricter the internal selection criteria, the higher the 
survival probability, the higher the diversification and the better the technological 
performances. Cautious behaviors seem to be rewarded. 
 
Therefore internal selection cannot be dropped from the evolutionary analysis of 
firms' and industries' evolution. In this perspective, there is room for a broader 
conceptualization of firms in favor of internal selection. 
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APPENDIX 
 
• γ determines the share of total R&D budget dedicated to R&D for process 
innovation. 
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where a(t-1) returns the number of productive activities at t-1 in the firm. γ ∈ [0;1]. 
 
• Distribution rule of the total R&D budget for process innovation between the 
different productive activities: 
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• β allows to determine the share of total R&D budget dedicated to R&D for 
diversification activities. 
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